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Introduction 
If theories of Supreme Court jurisprudence by major American statesmen were 
assembled side-by-side, the library would be small, and the works of James Wilson and Barack 
Obama would stand at either end.  Wilson was the most sophisticated legal theorist at the 
Constitutional Convention,1 a member of the first Supreme Court, and the author of a remarkable 
series of law lectures delivered at the College of Philadelphia, now the University of 
Pennsylvania, in the early 1790’s.2  Obama spent a dozen years as a civil rights lawyer and 
lecturer on constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School before being elected to 
the United States Senate in 2004 and then to the White House, just four years later.   
 Beyond biographical similarities and their efforts to straddle law and statesmanship, both 
men share an abiding concern for how justice may be served when a judge confronts the limits of 
the law, whether those limits be moral, in the case of Wilson, or written, in the case of Obama.  
Both men look beyond the law to extra-legal concepts to supplement a judge’s decision making, 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1789 341 (1956) (observing “[a]s a 
practical lawyer, Wilson was one of the outstanding legal figures of his day.  As a theorist, he had no serious 
rival.”); Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1-2 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 
1967) (calling Wilson "the most learned and profound legal scholar of his generation”). 
2 Here and throughout the Note, the basic facts of James Wilson’s life are taken from SMITH, supra note 1. 
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Wilson to the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid’s “common sense” theory of human action and 
thought, Obama to a theory of empathy he has consistently alluded to but never bothered to 
succinctly define.  Most importantly, both men have faced fierce criticism for advocating these 
extra-legal tools, in Obama’s case, criticism that persists to this day. 
 For Obama, the criticism was sparked by his first opportunity to nominate a Supreme 
Court Justice, when he called empathy “an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and 
outcomes” and, thus, the preeminent quality he would look for in his nominees.3  The reaction by 
Republicans was swift and scathing.  Within two days of the President’s statement, Utah Senator 
Orrin Hatch called empathy “a code word for an activist judge.”4  The pundit Charles 
Krauthammer said, “if nothing else, [conservatism] stands unequivocally against justice as 
empathy – and unequivocally for the principle of blind justice.”5  And Wendy Long, general 
counsel for the Judicial Confirmation Network and a former Supreme Court clerk to Justice 
Clarence Thomas, accused Obama of aiming to “become the first president in American history 
to make lawlessness an explicit standard for Supreme Court justices.”6 
 By the time of the nomination hearings over two months later, Senate Republicans had 
decided to turn the hearings into a show trial over the role of empathy in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  All six Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee singled out the 
President’s empathy standard for abuse in their opening statements.  Alabama Senator Jeff 
Sessions, the Committee’s ranking Republican member, said “such a philosophy is disqualified” 
from any rightful place in a judge’s decision making.7  Iowa Senator Charles Grassley declared 
                                                 
3 Barack Obama, Remarks on the Retirement of Supreme Court Justice David Souter (May 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900317.pdf [hereinafter Obama remarks on Souter]. 
4 This Week (ABC television broadcast May 3, 2009) (remarks by Senator Orrin Hatch). 
5 Charles Krauthammer, Sotomayor:  Rebut, Then Confirm, WASH. POST, May 29, 2009. 
6 Wendy Long, Opening of a Sorry Chapter, WASH. TIMES, May 4, 2009. 
7 Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor To Be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (July 13, 2009) (statement by Sen. Sessions). 
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“that judging based on empathy is really just legislating from the bench.”8  And South Carolina 
Senator Lindsay Graham said that picking Supreme Court nominees based on their capacity for 
empathy is “an absurd, dangerous standard.”9 
 For their part, the twelve Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee showed no 
interest in debating the jurisprudential merits of empathy.  Only two of them mentioned empathy 
in their opening statements, and in subsequent colloquies with Judge Sotomayor, empathy was 
barely mentioned except to make absolutely clear, in the words of Wisconsin Senator Russ 
Feingold, that a “judge’s ability to feel empathy does not, of course, mean the judge should rule 
one way or another.”10  
Yet, for all the hoopla surrounding the term, no one seemed to know exactly what the 
President meant when he called empathy an “essential ingredient” in judicial decision making.  
Senator Grassley averred that the President’s “empathy standard appears to encourage judges to 
make use of their personal politics, feelings, and preferences.”11  Rhode Island Senator Sheldon 
Whitehouse offered that empathy made a judge appreciate that the “courtroom can be the only 
sanctuary for the little guy, when the forces of society are arrayed against him.”12  New York 
Senator Chuck Schumer claimed that empathy is the opposite of “having ice water in your 
veins.”13  And Senator Sessions simply admitted, “I don’t know what empathy means.”14  
The aim of this article is to explain what Barack Obama means by empathy.  It will 
discuss when exactly empathy may provide an “essential ingredient” in Supreme Court 
                                                 
8 Id. (statement by Sen. Grassley). 
9 Id. (Statement by Sen. Graham). 
10 Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor To Be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (July 14, 2009) (statement by Sen. Feingold). 
11 Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor (July 13, 2009), supra note 7 (statement by Sen. Grassley). 
12 Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor (July 13, 2009), supra note 7 (statement by Sen. 
Whitehouse). 
13 Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor (July 13, 2009), supra note 7 (statement by Sen. Schumer). 
14 John Stanton, Sessions Is in the Spotlight, ROLL CALL, May 6, 2009. 
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jurisprudence, whether it can supply a Justice a sense of certainty in her rulings, and, finally, 
what the risks are of looking beyond the written law to an extra-legal concept like empathy in 
deciding a case.   
There are two significant hurdles to such an inquiry.  The first is that Obama has never 
written about his jurisprudence of empathy; the second is that no Justice has cited Obama’s 
empathy standard as determinative of a Supreme Court decision.  This article attempts to resolve 
these concerns in two ways.  In the first place, it takes seriously Obama’s public statements and 
published, non-legal writing on empathy.  The consistency of his remarks15 as well as his 
experience as a lawyer and constitutional law lecturer suggest that his use of the word empathy is 
neither careless nor imprecise but deserves serious consideration.  In the second place, it draws 
on James Wilson’s jurisprudence of common sense as an illustrative parallel to Obama’s 
jurisprudence of empathy.  Obama and Wilson share remarkably similar views on the law, its 
purpose, and its limits, and Wilson’s experience trying to implement a jurisprudence of common 
sense as a Supreme Court Justice provides an instructive example of the dangers of a judge using 
an extra-legal tool, like empathy, to reach her decisions.  
The article proceeds in three parts.  Part I defines Barack Obama’s jurisprudence of 
empathy and when it may be applied to judicial decisions.  Part II presents James Wilson’s 
jurisprudence of common sense as an instructive parallel to Obama’s jurisprudence of empathy.  
Part III discusses the perils of empathy as a tool for judicial decision making by examining why 
Wilson abjured it when it was presented to him in Adam Smith’s moral philosophy and by 
discussing the only major Supreme Court case where Wilson attempted to apply his common 
sense jurisprudence, Chisholm v. Georgia, to ends that proved disastrous. 
                                                 
15 See Peter Baker, In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking for Empathy by Another Name?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2010 (observing “Mr. Obama has been searching for empathy, or its rhetorical equivalent, in Supreme Court 
candidates for at least five years”). 
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I.  Barack Obama’s Jurisprudence of Empathy 
For those who long for sophisticated legal opinions from the Commander-in-Chief, 
Barack Obama seems especially promising.  Before being elected to the Senate, he served as 
President of the Harvard Law Review, was a practicing civil rights attorney, and taught 
constitutional law at the University of Chicago.  No less a legal scholar than Laurence Tribe has 
called him “the most impressive and talented of the thousands of students I have been privileged 
to teach in nearly 40 years on the Harvard faculty.”16 
Nevertheless, Obama has left almost no written clues as to his own views on Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  He published no law journal articles during his decade long tenure at the 
University of Chicago, and the only piece of legal scholarship he is known to have authored is a 
six-page, unsigned case note in the Harvard Law Review on a ruling by the Illinois Supreme 
Court that a fetus could not sue its mother for prenatal injuries.17  The Note, which Eugene 
Volokh describes as “calm and fairly uncontroversial,” does little to shed light on Obama’s 
jurisprudential views.18  
But this is not because Obama has no such views.  Indeed, as a Senator evaluating 
Supreme Court nominees and as a President making them, he has consistently stated that the 
capacity for empathy is an “essential ingredient” for him in evaluating potential members of the 
Court.  Because he has not written explicitly on the role of empathy in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, what exactly Obama means by empathy and what role it ought to play in a 
Justice’s decision making must be inferred from remarks and speeches he has made on nominees 
                                                 
16 Peter Zhu, Tribe Recalls Obama at HLS, HARV. CRIMSON, November 4, 2008.  
17 See Case Note, Prenatal Injuries – Supreme Court of Illinois Refuses to Recognize Cause of Action Brought by 
Fetus Against Its Mother for Unintentional Infliction of Prenatal Injuries, 103 HARV. L. REV. 823 (1990). 
18 Eugene Volokh, Obama’s Case Note, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Aug. 22, 2008, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1219415466.shtml. 
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to the Court as well as from his book, The Audacity of Hope, where he singles out empathy as the 
lynchpin to a personal ethics. 
A.  Beyond the Ballpark:  The Five Percent Rule 
Obama was elected to the Senate in the 2004 congressional midterm elections, but it 
wasn’t until the nomination of John Roberts to the Court in the summer of 2005 that Obama 
found a high-profile opportunity to discuss his views on Supreme Court jurisprudence and, 
specifically, what I call the Five Percent Rule. 
In his opening statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Roberts framed the 
work of a Supreme Court Justice as being akin to that of a baseball umpire.  Roberts said: 
 
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around.  Judges are 
like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. 
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure everybody 
plays by the rules. 
But it is a limited role.  Nobody ever went to the ballgame to see the 
umpire.19 
 
By his “umpireal analogy,” as Richard Posner described it, “Roberts was trying to navigate the 
treacherous shoals of a Senate confirmation hearing,” offering a vision of a Justice’s work that 
seemed at once simple and mechanical and, thus, uncontroversial.20  Unfortunately, for legal 
minds like Posner’s, it seemed deceptive as well:  “Neither [Roberts] nor any other 
knowledgeable person actually believed or believes that the rules that judges in our system 
apply, particularly appellate judges and most particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
are given to them the way the rules of baseball are given to umpires.”21 
                                                 
19 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States, Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement by John G. Roberts). 
20 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78 (2008). 
21 Id. 
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If judges—and “most particularly” Supreme Court Justices—are to be profitably 
compared to baseball umpires, Posner argued, “in addition to calling balls and strikes,” we must 
“imagine” that they also “made the rules of baseball and changed them at will.”22  Which is 
another way of saying that, for Posner at least, Supreme Court Justices and baseball umpires are 
really not that much alike after all.23  
 In light of the fact that he was one of twenty-two Democrats in the Senate who voted 
against the confirmation of Roberts, it is probably not shocking that Obama did not embrace his 
“umpireal analogy” of Supreme Court service.  What may be surprising, however, is the degree 
to which he grants its underlying logic.  Unlike Posner, Obama has said on at least two occasions 
that, in ninety-five percent of the cases that come before the Supreme Court, the “umpireal 
analogy”—insofar as it describes a decision making process that, to the well trained eye, is 
straightforward and mechanical—holds true for the Court’s decisions. 
 In the Senate speech where he announced he would vote against confirmation, Obama 
described what he called “the basic precepts that go into deciding 95 percent of cases that come 
before the Federal court.”24  These include:  “adherence to precedence, a certain modesty in 
reading statues and constitutional text, a respect for procedural regularity, and an impartiality in 
presiding over the adversarial system.”25  Obama said that it was apparent to him that Roberts 
“does, in fact, deeply respect” these “basic precepts” of judicial decision making, what on 
Roberts’s own terms might be called the “official rules” by which judges call legal balls and 
strikes. Moreover, such respect, when combined with Roberts’s “intellectual rigor” and 
                                                 
22 Id. at 78-79. 
23 For a novel reinterpretation of Roberts’s analogy, see Aaron Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the 
Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/03/03/zelinsky.html 
(arguing “the appropriate analog for a Justice of the Supreme Court is not an umpire, but the Commissioner of 
Major League Baseball”). 
24 151 CONG. REC. 10,366 (Sept. 22, 2005) (statement by Sen. Obama) [hereinafter Obama floor speech]. 
25 Id. 
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“honesty” in addition to “the comportment and the temperament that makes for a good judge,” 
made Obama “sorely tempted” to vote for confirmation.26  
 Yet Obama did not cast that vote, invoking the Five Percent Rule to explain his decision.  
As he later described it in remarks to Planned Parenthood during the presidential campaign:  
“Good intellect.  You read the statute.  You look at the case law, and most of the time, the law is 
pretty clear – 95% of the time.  Justice Ginsburg, Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia – they’re all 
gonna agree on the outcome.”27  Nevertheless, this leaves “those 5 percent of cases that are truly 
difficult,” where “the constitutional text will not be directly on point,” the “language of the 
statute will not be perfectly clear,” and the “[l]egal process alone will not lead you to a rule of 
decision.”28  For Obama, these cases include 
 
whether affirmative action is an appropriate response to the history of 
discrimination in this country or whether a general right of privacy encompasses a 
more specific right of women to control their reproductive decisions or whether 
the commerce clause empowers congress to speak on those issues of broad 
national concern that may be only tangentially related to what is easily defined as 
interstate commerce, whether a person who is disabled has a right to be 
accommodated so they can work alongside those who are nondisabled….29 
  
Such cases, on Obama’s account, are not just outside the strike zone of straightforward judicial 
decision making, they are beyond the ballpark.  More importantly, “it’s those 5% of the cases 
that really count.”30   
What makes the difference in such cases?  Empathy, Obama has repeatedly said, “that’s 
the criteria by which I’m going to be selecting my judges.”31 
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 Abby Livingston & Mark Murray, Context of Obama’s ‘Empathy Remarks’, MSNBC, May 1, 2009, 
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2009/05/01/1918695.aspx (quoting President Barack Obama, Remarks to the 
Planned Parenthood Action Fund (July 17, 2007)). [hereinafter Obama Planned Parenthood remarks] 




B.  The Empathy Difference:  A Radical Faith  
 Obama’s nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Court in May of 2009 gave the newly 
elected President an opportunity to restate his views on the qualities he looks for in a Supreme 
Court Justice.  As he did four years before with the nomination of John Roberts, Obama relied on 
the Five Percent Rule to describe those qualities that were “essential” for resolving ninety-five 
percent of the cases that came before the Court but “insufficient” for deciding the final five 
percent.32  These qualities, said Obama, were “a rigorous intellect,” “an understanding that a 
judge’s job is to interpret, not make, law,” “a commitment to impartial justice,” “a respect for 
precedent and a determination to faithfully apply the law to the facts at hand.”33  Yet for the final 
five percent of cases—the cases that are “truly difficult” and that “really count”—“[w]e need 
something more.”34 
 That “something” is empathy, what Obama calls “an essential ingredient for arriving at 
just decisions and outcomes” in the five percent of cases that don’t allow for straightforward 
decision making.35  But what exactly does Obama mean by empathy and what might a 
jurisprudence of empathy look like? 
 In The Audacity of Hope, published shortly before he began his presidential campaign, 
Obama illustrates what he means by empathy by invoking his friend Paul Simon, the late Senator 
from Illinois and a supporter of Obama during his 2004 Senate campaign.36  Simon, says Obama, 
had the remarkable ability of “garnering support from people who disagreed, sometimes 
vigorously, with his liberal politics,” largely because such people believed “that he cared about 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 Obama Planned Parenthood remarks, supra note 29. 
32 Barack Obama, Remarks on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to Be a Supreme Court Associate Justice (May 
26, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900402.pdf [hereinafter Obama 
remarks on Sotomayor]. 
33 Id. 
34 Obama remarks on Sotomayor, supra note 34. 
35 Obama remarks on Souter, supra note 3. 
36 See Steve Neal, Obama's Endorsements Stacking Up, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec 31, 2003. 
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them and what they were going through.”37  Obama terms this “aspect of Paul’s character” a 
“sense of empathy,” a trait, he says, “I find myself appreciating more and more as I get older.” 38  
He then goes on to define empathy as the lynchpin to a personal ethics.  Empathy, he says, “is 
the heart of my moral code, and it is how I understand the Golden Rule—not simply as a call to 
sympathy or charity, but as something more demanding, a call to stand in somebody else’s shoes 
and see through their eyes.39 
Beyond what it says about his personal ethics, what is notable about this passage is the 
connection Obama makes between a moral act, the extension of “sympathy or charity,” and a 
facially neutral practice, empathy.40  To “stand in somebody else’s shoes and see through their 
eyes” is no more than an imaginative exercise by which we try to gain access to and make sense 
of the experience of another.  It does not require that we feel sympathy for the people whose 
experiences we attempt to share, much less does it necessarily lead to any conclusions about 
what actions are morally required of us vis-à-vis such people. 
 Yet central to Obama’s understanding of empathy and the role it plays in public life, 
generally, and jurisprudence, in particular, is a belief that the practice of empathy compels clear 
answers to what might otherwise be difficult moral questions.  The strength of this belief helps to 
distinguish Obama from the legal realists, the school of legal theory with which his jurisprudence 
shares most in common.  Obama agrees with a primary tenet of legal realism that “the actual 
deciding” of difficult cases is rarely “done by way of formal and accurate deduction in the 
manner of formal logic.”41  Indeed, when he says he favors a judge who “understands that justice 
                                                 




41 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 11 (1960). 
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isn’t about some abstract legal theory or footnote in a case book,”42 he hearkens back to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s declaration that the law “cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the 
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics”43 and to Benjamin Cardozo’s pronouncement 
that “no judge of a high court, worthy of his office, views the function of his place so 
narrowly.”44 Moreover, he agrees with the legal realists that a judge’s decisions tend to be 
shaped by personal experience, citing Holmes’s famous dictum, “[t]he life of the law has not 
been logic:  it has been experience,” when he nominated Elena Kagan to replace retiring Justice 
John Paul Stevens.45  
Nevertheless, for Holmes and other legal realists, their discussion of the relationship 
between experience and law aims to be a factual description of how the law evolves and how 
decisions are made in the courtroom.  They do not make an argument on behalf of experience 
except to warn judges who might take Roberts’s “umpireal analogy” too seriously that, in the 
words of Holmes, the “felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with 
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by 
which men should be governed.”46  In fact, while the legal realists agree that personal experience 
informs the decision of a judge, they hold that it most often has its effect at a subconscious level.  
Experience, said Cardozo, creates “a stream of tendency” that “gives coherence and direction to 
                                                 
42 Obama remarks on Souter, supra note 3. 
43 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
44 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921). 
45 HOLMES, supra note 47, at 1 quoted in Remarks by President Obama on the Nomination of Solicitor General 
Elena Kagan to Supreme Court (May 10, 2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-and-solicitor-general-elena-kagan-nomination-solicitor-general-el. 
46 HOLMES, supra note 47, at 1. 
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thought and action.”47  Judges “cannot escape” it, he continues, though they “do not recognize 
and cannot name” the “forces” that “have been tugging at them.”48   
Obama’s jurisprudence distinguishes itself from legal realism in that it relies on a 
particular type of experience, that which comes from the practice of empathy, to help us self-
consciously transcend the limits of our personal experience.  When we empathize with another, 
Obama says, we are “forced beyond our limited vision,” and when we compare that person’s 
experience with our own, no matter how different it may be, we find “common ground” between 
us.49  The feeling of moral imperative that comes from this experience also distances Obama 
from the descriptive project of legal realism.  The practice of empathy, he says, has a profound 
impact on us – “[w]e are all shaken out of our complacency” – with the effect that we feel 
compelled to take actions whose moral imperative seems universal and clear.50 
To illustrate the transformative effect of empathy, consider another passage where 
Obama discusses what he calls an “empathy deficit” and what the moral and practical 
consequences would be if that deficit were overcome: 
 
[A]s a country, we seem to be suffering from an empathy deficit.  We wouldn’t 
tolerate schools that don’t teach, that are chronically underfunded and 
understaffed and underinspired, if we thought that the children in them were like 
our children.  It’s hard to imagine the CEO of a company giving himself a 
multimillion-dollar bonus while cutting health-care coverage for his workers if he 
thought they were in some sense his equals.  And it’s safe to assume that those in 
power would think longer and harder about launching a war if they envisioned 
their own sons and daughters in harm’s way.51 
 
                                                 
47 CARDOZO, supra note 48. 
48 AUDACITY, supra note 41, at 66. 
49 Id. at 68. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
  13
As this passage makes clear, Obama believes that the practice of empathy not only leads people 
to understand the experience of others and to find “common ground,” it compels them, regardless 
their differences, to recognize and confront difficult moral matters and to come to the same 
conclusions about how to resolve them.  The CEO doesn’t simply understand what the worker 
might feel if his health care is cut, he feels compelled to limit the size of his own bonus.  The 
wealthy mother doesn’t merely appreciate the differences between the scholastic experience of 
her son and that of a child from a poorer neighborhood, she is moved to agitate on behalf of 
educational equality.  Here, as elsewhere, Obama never questions whether it could be the case 
that the practice of empathy might have different effects on people.  He seems to believe that any 
parent or CEO in a similar position who exercised empathy would come to the same conclusion 
about the moral dimensions of the situation and feel moved to take the same action.   
This is Obama’s radical faith in the power of empathy.  On his account, the moral 
imperatives that empathy reveals to us have a self-evident, universal force such that any person 
who practices empathy would recognize them and feel compelled to act.  Empathy, in turn, 
provides the key not only to Obama’s personal ethics but also to how he understands justice and 
how it is best served in Supreme Court cases that fall within the Five Percent Rule.  As he said in 
his remarks on the retirement of Justice David Souter, Obama endeavors to select Justices who 
understand that the essence of justice is not “some abstract legal theory or footnote in a case 
book” but rather 
  
how our laws affect the daily realities of people’s lives – whether they can make a 
living and care for their families; whether they feel safe in their homes and 
welcome in their nation. 
I view that quality of empathy, or understanding and identifying with 
people’s hopes and struggles as an essential ingredient for arriving at just 
decisions and outcomes.52   
                                                 
52 Obama remarks on Souter, supra note 3. 
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Here we see the difference empathy can make in the cases that come before the Supreme Court.  
Ninety-five percent of them may be decided, and justice may be served, by recourse to “basic 
precepts” of judicial decision making.  All that a Justice need do, according to Obama, is call 
legal balls and strikes—no more.  However, in those five percent of cases that cannot be so 
straightforwardly decided, Obama believes that a Justice who practices empathy will recognize 
and be guided by the moral imperatives that make for just decisions.  The practice of empathy 
will not only reveal these imperatives to her and lend them a sense of urgency, she can act on 
them with the belief that they have a moral salience that is universal and clear, at least to anyone 
else who also practices empathy.   
Of course, by Obama’s own account, many people don’t bother practicing empathy, 
hence the “empathy deficit,” but he clearly believes such people should not have the final say in 
the small subset of cases where a Justice’s opinion of what makes for a just decision determines 
the final outcome of a case.53  In “those difficult cases,” Obama has said, “the critical ingredient 
is supplied by what is in the judge’s heart.”54  If that heart is a cradle for empathy, justice will be 
served.  
II.  James Wilson’s Jurisprudence of Common Sense 
 If Barack Obama’s efforts to articulate the role of empathy in judicial decision making 
represents the latest attempt by a major statesman to articulate a novel theory of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, James Wilson’s was the first.   
One of the most consequential minds of the founding era, Wilson’s life and 
accomplishments have largely been forgotten.  Born in a tiny village in the Scottish Lowlands in 
                                                 
53 AUDACITY, supra note 41, at 68. 
54 Obama floor speech, supra note 26. 
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1742, Wilson spent five years at St. Andrews on a scholarship studying to join the ministry 
before boarding a ship to the New World in 1765.  He arrived in Philadelphia and not long after 
applied to study law as an apprentice under John Dickinson, the founder and pamphleteer who 
gained fame under the pen name of the “Pennsylvania Farmer”.  When he had completed his 
legal education, in 1770, Wilson moved west to the small frontier town of Carlisle, where he 
established a legal practice.  As a highly successful lawyer, a man of nearly unparalleled 
education, and a striver of unmatched ambition, he soon rose to prominence, getting himself 
elected to the Second Continental Congress and later to the Philadelphia Convention, making 
him one of only six men to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.  He 
was also one of the most vocal members of the Convention, and his many contributions to the 
Constitution, in the opinion of Max Farrand, placed Wilson “second to [James] Madison and 
almost on par with him.”55 
Eschewing his offer to become Chief Justice, George Washington named Wilson 
Associate Justice to the first Supreme Court in 1789, where he remained until his tragic and 
untimely passing in 1798.  At the time of his death, Wilson was hiding out in the small town of 
Edenton, North Carolina.  He was supposed to be riding circuit as part of his duties as a Justice, 
but the country was in the grips of a credit crisis, and Wilson, an insatiable land speculator, had 
been forced to flee his creditors.  He was unable to make his loan repayments, and if his creditors 
caught up with him, he would be thrown in jail again, as he had been in New Jersey just a few 
weeks before.  His wife Hannah found him in Edenton, in the Horniblow Tavern, a dim and 
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expensive boarding house where Wilson was busy trying to untangle his finances and redeem his 
fate.  Shortly after she arrived, a stroke crippled her husband.  He died three days later and was 
buried in a simple grave at the estate of North Carolina Governor Samuel Johnston, the father-in-
law of James Iredell, an Associate Justice like Wilson as well as his dear friend. 
The embarrassing circumstances of Wilson’s death cast a pall over his life and work, 
obscuring them before the eyes of history, which largely forgot Wilson over the next two 
hundred years.  Recently, scholars have sought to rehabilitate his reputation, though in light of 
his extraordinary contributions to the Constitution and colonial thought generally, much remains 
to be done before Wilson is accorded his rightful place in the history of the nation’s founding.   
Among his written work, the project of Wilson’s that is most deserving of reconsideration 
is his unfinished series of law lectures.  Over 600 pages in length, they were never published 
during Wilson’s lifetime and delivered only in part over a four-month period between 1790 and 
1791 at the College of Philadelphia, now the University of Pennsylvania.  Given his erudition 
and work as a jurist, the choice of Wilson to deliver the lectures was hardly surprising.  “As a 
practical lawyer,” Charles Page Smith has said, “Wilson was one of the outstanding legal figures 
of his day.  As a theorist, he had no serious rival.”56 Despite his duties as a Justice and the 
demands of his business ventures, Wilson took up the challenge of devising the lectures with 
nothing less than the aim of “founding a new school of American jurisprudence.”57  He hoped to 
become the American Blackstone, and while he did not succeed, the lectures remain invaluable 
for the insight they shed on the early American conception of law as well as the role of the 
judiciary, and most particularly the Supreme Court, in the newly incorporated United States. 
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For our purposes, of special interest is Wilson’s discussion of what a judge ought to do 
when law or precedent compels an unjust decision.  These are Wilson’s “truly difficult” cases, 
but when a judge is faced with them, Wilson would not have him turn to empathy.  He would 
have him look to common sense, instead.   
A.  Wilson’s “Truly Difficult” Cases 
 Obama’s “basic precepts” of judicial decision making—“adherence to precedence, a 
certain modesty in reading statues and constitutional text, a respect for procedural regularity, and 
an impartiality in presiding over the adversarial system”—are all recognized by Wilson in his 
law lectures as both necessary to judicial decision making and sufficient for disposing of nearly 
all cases.58   
 In his lecture “Of Government,” Wilson frames the responsibility of judges by describing 
what would happen if “the legislative and judicial powers [were] united in the same person.”59  
The danger, says Wilson, is that judges could not be relied upon to dispense equal justice for 
they “would not be governed by any fixed or known principles of law.”60  Judges might consult 
such principles, but they would not be bound by them, and thus, whenever they were confronted 
with a law they didn’t favor, “Proteus-like, they might immediately assume the form of 
legislators; and, in that shape, they might escape from every fetter and obligation of law.”61   
The consequences for a free people would be dire:  “The lives, liberties, and properties of 
the citizens would be committed to arbitrary judges, whose decisions would, in effect, be 
dictated by their own private opinions.”62  Accordingly, Wilson emphasizes that each of the three 
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branches of government must “be preserved distinct, and unmingled, in the exercise of its 
separate powers.”63  What exclusive power does the judiciary exercise?  Wilson defines it 
succinctly:  “The judicial authority consists in applying, according to the principles of right and 
justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in which the manner or 
principles of this application are disputed by the parties interested in them.64” 
Wilson is clear that judges are charged with applying the laws, not creating them, and he 
sees four qualities as being necessary for their work.  The first is a detailed understanding of the 
law, both in theory and in practice.  Adjudicating legal disputes, Wilson declares, “cannot 
properly be made without the possession of skill in the science of jurisprudence.”65  Second is 
impartiality.  Judges must exhibit “the most unbiassed [sic] behavior” in discharging their duties 
lest their decisions appear driven by private opinions rather than the demands of equal justice.66  
The third quality is independence.  Judges must be insulated from politics in “their salaries and 
in their offices,” for beyond being impartial, they must also “be removed from the most distant 
apprehension of being affected, in their judicial character and capacity, by any thing, except their 
own behaviour and its consequences.”67   
The fourth and final quality is a respect for precedent, a concern that takes up roughly 
half of a later lecture, “Of the Judges.”  A judge, says Wilson, “should bear a great regard to the 
sentiments and decisions of those, who have thought and decided before him.”68  He gives two 
reasons for such deference.  The first is that people depend upon the judgments of others for 
guidance in their decisions, particularly those who have come before them.  A “man must have 
                                                 
63 Id. at 705. 
64 Id. at 703. 
65 Id. at 704. 
66 Id 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 952.  
  19
uncommon confidence in his own talents,” Wilson says, who “feels not a sensible and strong 
satisfaction in the concurrence of the judgments and opinion of others, equally or more 
conversant than himself with the subjects” under consideration.69  The second reason for 
deference to precedent is that, for judges, prior judgments in similar cases should “be considered 
as strong evidence of the law.”70  Every “prudent and cautious judge will appreciate them,” 
Wilson says, and by appreciating them, he “will remember, that his duty and his business is, not 
to make the law, but to interpret and apply it.”71 
However, respect for precedent is not without qualification, for it is the one quality of 
judicial decision making that Wilson believes a judge should not strictly adhere to.  “Implicit 
deference to authority, as I have declared on more occasions than one, I consider as the bane of 
science,” he says.  “Stare decisis may prevent the trouble of investigation; but it will prevent also 
the pleasure and the advantages of improvement.”72   
To illustrate the hazards of a judge’s blind adherence to precedent, Wilson describes the 
dangers of legalistic myopia, pitting the law “studied and practised as a science founded in 
principle” against the law “followed as a trade, depending merely upon precedent.”73  The latter 
approach, says Wilson, is most familiar to a law office, where “even the minutiae of practice are 
objects of regard.”74  Such attention to detail may be put to “useful, nay, to splendid purposes,” 
but when one is “confined to microscopick observations,” the legal mind is narrowed and 
stunted.75  “Tied to the centre of precedent,” says Wilson, the lawyer “treads, for life, the same 
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dull, and small, and uniform circle around it, without daring to view or to enjoy a single object 
on either side.”76 
For a judge, the danger of this legalistic myopia is that he will favor the bonds of 
precedent over the demands of justice, and Wilson believes unequivocally that a judge must 
sometimes make decisions that go beyond precedent or even the written law in order to reach a 
just conclusion.   
Wilson gives two such examples, both of which take their cue from the relationship 
between equity and common law courts in the English legal system.  Judges in the older common 
law courts were bound by precedential decision making, whereas the Court of Chancery, the 
equity court, was an amendatory court in which the Lord Chancellor was free to make judgments 
that went beyond common law precedent.  Such decisions, however, were only to be reached in 
situations where a petitioner had succeeded in convincing the Lord Chancellor that if his case 
were subjected to the precedents established by the common law, it would yield a grossly 
inequitable outcome.  The Court of Chancery, in turn, did not disregard common law precedents 
outright.  It only, in extraordinary circumstances, amended them, leading the legal historian 
Frederic Maitland to declare:  “Equity without common law would have been a castle in the air, 
an impossibility.”77 
Drawing on the differences between these two courts, in his lecture “Of the Judicial 
Department,” Wilson describes two situations in which judges are obliged to defer to the 
demands of equitable justice over legal precedent or the written law.  The first instance involves 
cases that “would have been specified and excepted” from the written law had the lawmakers 
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foreseen them.78  Such an exercise in judicial decision making, which Wilson warns “ought to be 
made with the greatest circumspection,” sees the judge looking to “the spirit of the law, or the 
motive which prevailed on the legislature to make it” in order to decide beyond, or even in 
contradiction to, its written terms.79   
The second, more intriguing case involves Wilson’s discussion of the relationship 
between law and equity.  Wilson cites the contention by one of his jurisprudential heroes, the 
Scottish jurist Henry Home, Lord Kames, that “the boundary between equity and common law 
[must] be clearly ascertained; because, otherwise, we shall in vain hope for a just decision.”80  
Given Wilson’s strong belief that the powers of the three branches of government must “be 
preserved distinct, and unmingled.”81 and that a judge must remember “his duty and his business 
is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it,”82 one might expect Wilson to support 
Kames’s position.  He does, but not without reservation, providing a theory of the legal progress 
in which considerations of equity are allowed to shape a judge’s decisions when written law or 
precedent otherwise compels a manifestly unjust outcome. 
In his theory, Wilson describes a line between law and equity that moves according to the 
“fluctuating situation of men and business.”83  The line is initially drawn in “rude ages” when 
“the first decisions of judges arose, probably, from their immediate feelings; in other words, 
from considerations of equity.”84  Over time, as judges ruled on similar cases, they would reach 
similar conclusions creating a “number of precedents” and eventually the “[g]eneral rules” which 
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form the basis of law.85  However, these rules, once enshrined in law, would often be found by 
judges to be, “at some times, too narrow; at other times, too broad.”86  Judges would thus be 
faced with an untenable situation.  To “adhere rigidly” to these laws, “at all times, would be to 
commit injustice under the sanction of the law.”87  Consequently, in order to “avoid an evil so 
alarming,” a judge will think it “advisable, upon extraordinary occasions, to recede from general 
maxims, and to decide, as originally, according to the immediate sentiments of justice.”88  These 
decisions, made “from considerations of equity,” serve to revise the law, creating a new legal 
precedent until such a time as another judge decides that, in order to “avoid an evil,” that 
precedent must be changed or disregarded, too.89 
Wilson’s theory of legal progress serves two purposes.  On the one hand, it aims to 
describe how this tension between law and equity propels the development of the law, 
establishing a legal line which, Wilson says, “will be found to change necessarily according to 
different circumstances.”90  As Wilson explains this development: 
  
[L]aw and equity are in a state of continual progression; one occupying 
incessantly the ground, which the other, in its advancement, has left.  The posts 
now possessed by strict law were formerly possessed by equity; and the posts now 
possessed by equity will hereafter be possessed by strict law.91 
 
The second, more intriguing purpose of this theory is to provide the space and justification for 
judges in a court of law, “upon extraordinary occasions,” to look beyond precedent or even the 
written law “to immediate sentiments of justice” in making their decisions.92  Wilson not only 
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grants judges such space in judicial decision making, he thinks it essential for a just society.  
Equity, he says, may be “deemed the conductor of law towards a state of refinement and 
perfection.”93  Thus, he concludes, “we can find no difficulty in pronouncing, that every court of 
law ought also to be a court of equity; for every institution should contain in it the seeds of its 
perfection, as well as of its preservation.”94 
 In his emphasis on the need for judges to occasionally go beyond precedent and written 
law in the pursuit of justice, Wilson’s theory of legal progress bears comparison to Obama’s Five 
Percent Rule and how he frames the limits of the law in “truly difficult” cases.   True, Wilson 
emphasizes those moments where a judge’s decision to hew strictly to precedent or the written 
law would lead to a patent injustice, whereas Obama focuses on those cases where law or 
precedent does not dictate a clear decision.  Nevertheless, both men would agree with Obama’s 
declaration that “in those difficult cases, the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the 
judge’s heart.”95  
They would disagree, however, on what exactly that ingredient is. 
B.  The Common Sense Difference:  Another Radical Faith 
Like Obama, who believes that practicing empathy allows a judge to understand the 
meaning of justice beyond “some abstract legal theory or footnote in a casebook,”96 Wilson 
holds that a judge must sometimes look beyond the “general maxims” of written law or 
precedent to “the immediate sentiments of justice” in order to decide a case.97  However, for 
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Wilson, empathy does not provide access to such sentiments.  Instead, he looks to a particular 
conception of “common sense.” 
In the “Plan” for his law lectures, Wilson approvingly cites the claim by another of his 
jurist-heroes, Henry St. John First Viscount Bolingbroke, that in order for law to be “ranked 
among the learned professions, one of the vantage grounds, to which men must climb, is 
metaphysical,” a task that demands students of the law to “pry into the secret recesses of the 
human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole moral world, that they may discover 
the abstract reason of all laws.”98  Accordingly, before he discusses any discrete areas of law, 
Wilson devotes much of his second lecture to exploring “the philosophy of the human mind” – 
what he takes Bolingbroke to mean by “metaphysical” knowledge – a study he believes will 
provide “the abstract reason of all laws” and, thus, the key to understanding and administering 
justice.99   
In order to “pry into the secret recesses of the human heart,” Wilson turns to the Scottish 
philosopher Thomas Reid and his common sense theory of human thought and action.  A rebuttal 
to the philosophical skepticism of his contemporaries Bishop Berkeley and David Hume, Reid’s 
theory describes a series of intuitive principles divinely implanted in the mind that provide 
human beings access to certain knowledge and “irresistibly govern the belief and conduct of 
mankind in the common concerns of life.”100  A number of these principles are revealed to us by 
“an original power or faculty in man” that is known by various names, “the moral sense, the 
moral faculty, conscience.”101  This faculty enables us to determine “what is morally good, and 
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what is morally ill,” informing us about the world of human conduct in the same way the five 
senses – touch, taste, smell, and so forth – describe for us the physical world.102  As Reid 
explains it, as “by the Eye we judge of Light and Darkness of Colour and Figure,” so “by our 
Moral Faculty we judge of right and wrong in Conduct.”103  The feelings supplied by this moral 
sense, “whose truth is immediately perceived without reasoning, by all men come to years of 
understanding,” provide a kind of divine moral compass that all human beings share, hence a 
common sense.104 
Wilson calls upon Reid’s theory of common sense, and the theory of the mind implied by 
it, to provide Bolingbroke’s “vantage ground” to survey “the whole moral world” and thereby 
discover the “abstract reason of all laws.”105  Wilson says that, in addition to the “revealed law” 
of “holy scriptures,” human law is “promulgated by reason and the moral sense,” what Wilson 
calls “the divine monitors within us.”106  These two sources of law form the basis of natural law, 
and together they propel the development of written law and common law precedent, acting as 
“one united stream, which, by its combined force and just direction, will impel us uniformly and 
effectually towards our greatest good.”107   
This development helps to spur “the progress of societies toward perfection.”108  Yet, 
Wilson says, this progress has “hitherto been but slow,” and “by many unpropitious events, it has 
often been interrupted.”109  One such interruption is the situation described above, where judicial 
precedent compels a decision that would result in a manifest injustice.  Another more jarring 
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interruption is when a legislature issues what Wilson calls “repugnant commands.”110  Both 
interruptions may be resolved, however, and progress may be furthered by a judge having 
recourse to “the immediate sentiments of justice,” sentiments that spring from a divinely 
appointed faculty, the moral sense.  Acting on this sense, a judge in the first case may overrule 
precedent, establishing a new and better one.  Similarly, in the second case, when confronted 
with a “repugnant” law, the moral sense may compel a judge to “pronounce it void.” 111  That 
Wilson grants judges such license may seem surprising given his strong feelings about the need 
for the separation of powers as well as his belief that the duty and business of a judge is to not to 
make law, but to interpret and apply it.  Nevertheless, Wilson makes clear that a legislature “may 
unquestionably, be controlled by natural or revealed law, proceeding from divine authority.”112  
The United States Congress is no exception.  
By this light, Wilson’s faith in common sense appears no less radical than Obama’s faith 
in empathy.  On the contrary, it is surely more so.  As Arthur Wilmarth describes it, “Wilson’s 
confidence in the divine authority of the moral sense led him to view federal judges as 
pathfinders for the rest of society in discovering and enforcing the unwritten dictates of natural 
law.”113  Obama, for his part, has never suggested that judges be allowed to strike down laws and 
upend precedent in the furtherance of divinely appointed social progress.  And while he does 
believe that the practice of empathy gives human beings a better understanding of the demands 
of justice, as a jurisprudential matter, he only allows for empathy to be determinative in those 
Supreme Court cases where the law is unclear.  Wilson’s jurisprudence, by contrast, holds that 
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the dictates of the moral sense, insofar as they provide access to “divine authority,” provide a 
judge legitimate grounds to revise clear legal precedents and even to “void” laws that appear 
manifestly unjust.  Judges may not have the responsibility of writing the laws – that is the duty of 
the legislator – but they act as God’s agents in striking them down whenever enforcing them 
would commit a grave injustice.114 
III.  The Bedrock of Jurisprudential Certainty 
 Though they differ in form and application, Obama’s jurisprudence of empathy and 
Wilson’s jurisprudence of common sense both provide Justices with decision making tools to 
call upon when the law fails to provide clear guidance or, in Wilson’s case, when it compels a 
manifest injustice.  Yet they also present the same problem of the manner in which a judge 
establishes legal certainty when she decides to anchor her decision beyond precedent or written 
law. 
 One can speculate that this very concern helped persuade Wilson to anchor his 
jurisprudence in common sense rather than in empathy.  Indeed, though the word empathy was 
coined in the late 19th century, the idea was familiar in Wilson’s day, finding a formidable 
exponent in the Scottish philosopher Adam Smith.  Smith’s fame now rests upon The Wealth of 
Nations, but long before its publication, he was well known as a moral philosopher, holding the 
prestigious position of Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow until 1764, 
just a year before Wilson sailed for the New World, when he was succeeded by his friend and 
intellectual adversary Thomas Reid.  
 Smith’s great work of moral philosophy, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, was first 
published in 1759.  It describes a human world where the practice of empathy shapes our 
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personal ethics and prompts moral action.  The work, briefly explained, holds that, while human 
beings are largely selfish, there are “evidently some principles” in human nature by which we 
take an “interest in the fortune of others.”115  Yet because “we have no immediate experience of 
what other men feel,” when we encounter someone who appears to be suffering, using our 
imaginations, “we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person 
with him.”116  By this imaginative act, “we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments” 
as the other man, and his “agonies” are “thus brought home to ourselves.”117 
This is the practice of empathy as Smith describes it.  By it, we grow accustomed to 
comparing with others what our responses would be to a wide range of situations while also 
watching other spectators to determine if their responses mirror our own.118  Such routine 
comparisons provide our social world with moral contours, for when we find that “the original 
passions of the person” in a particular situation are in “perfect concord with the sympathetic 
emotions of the spectator,” these passions appear to us “just and proper.”119 These observations, 
and the conclusions we draw from them, show us how we should act in social situations and 
what is morally required of us vis-à-vis others; they also compel us to observe our own actions 
by positing an imaginary third person, what Smith famously calls the “impartial spectator.”  In 
order to make “any proper comparison between our own interests and those of other people,”120 
Smith says we must view those interests neither from our own standpoint nor theirs, but “from 
the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and 
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who judges with impartiality between us.”121 Drawing on our experience watching others and 
putting ourselves in their shoes, this phantom of our imaginations, the impartial spectator, acts as 
“the great judge and arbiter of [our] conduct,”122 shaping our actions by his approval and 
disapproval of them such that “[t]he man of the most perfect virtue . . . is he who joins, to the 
most perfect command of his own original and selfish feelings, the most exquisite sensibility 
both to the original and sympathetic feelings of others.”123 
This is a very brief overview of a rich and complex work, but insofar as it describes how 
empathy shapes our social world, directs our action, shows us right from wrong, and gives us 
special access to impartial judgments, it is clear that Wilson could have looked to The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, rather than Reid’s work, to inform his jurisprudence.  Moreover, we know that 
Wilson studied Smith, whose influence is found throughout his writing, from his first published 
work in 1768, a series of anonymous essays titled The Visitant,124 to his 1785 pamphlet 
“Considerations on the Bank of North America,” where he cites Smith by name as an authority 
on economic matters.125  On a few occasions, Wilson even draws on The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments in his law lectures, using Smith’s distinction between praise and praiseworthiness126 
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and citing an anecdote about the attachment of a lonely prisoner to a spider in his cell,127 both 
without attribution. 
 Why, then, did Wilson not draw on Smith more extensively in his jurisprudence?  A 
likely answer is that Smith’s theory omitted anything resembling Reid’s moral sense and the 
divine certainty it promised.  Reid himself criticized Smith for only discussing how we compare 
the relative merits of actions and opinions by the practice of empathy, not how we guarantee 
their moral certainty.  As Reid described Smith’s theory, “I judge of your Resentment by my 
Resentment, of your Love by my Love,” and “I neither have nor can have any other way of 
judging about them.”128   
Reid rejects this account of morality, saying of Smith’s work, “the ultimate Measure & 
Standard of Right and Wrong in human Conduct according to this System of Sympathy, is not 
any fixed Judgment grounded upon Truth or upon dictates of a well formed Conscience but the 
variable passions of men.”129  Reid’s objection was not that we should be so compelled by the 
joys or pains of others, but that, according to Smith, these reactions gave no certain evidence of 
right or wrong.  They were simply facts of our immediate emotional state, not divine signs of 
moral approval or disapproval, and thus could provide us no certain direction for our actions or 
judgments.   
This problem of moral certainty is one that Obama never wrestles with in his own 
jurisprudence of empathy.  He never considers the possibility that the practice of empathy might 
lead us to moral conclusions that will vary over time or even to different conclusions at the same 
time.  On the contrary, he seems to have an abiding belief that, by practicing empathy, we will 
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come to a shared moral clarity about the actions demanded of us.  As a jurisprudential matter, he 
thus sees empathy as an “essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes” not 
because it provides a Justice one possible way of resolving “truly difficult” cases, but because it 
provides her decision the same bedrock of certainty and moral imperative that anchors Wilson’s 
jurisprudence of common sense. 
I have called this a radical faith in empathy, and like any faith, it is not shared by 
everyone, perhaps most notably Justice Sonia Sotomayor.  In her now famous “wise Latina” 
speech, she expressed her belief that human differences may be so resilient that no type of 
experience, that provided by empathy or otherwise, will see judges come to the same conclusions 
on difficult matters.  Indeed, her controversial remark—“I would hope that a wise Latina woman 
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a 
white male who hasn't lived that life”130—reflects the fact that, as a jurisprudential matter, when 
one doesn’t believe that individuals can ever fully transcend the limits of their experience, she is 
left to “hope” that certain life experiences dispose a judge to reach “better” conclusions in “truly 
difficult” cases than the life experiences of other judges.131  To that end, it should come as no 
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surprise that Justice Sotomayor vests her own hope for judicial wisdom in the very life 
experiences that are essentially her own. 
Obama’s jurisprudence of empathy aims to elide any battles over the relative merits of a 
judge’s biography.  The only experience that matters to him is the one by which we transcend 
our differences by learning “to stand in somebody’s else’s shoes and see through their eyes.”132 
Yet even if we grant Obama his article of faith in empathy, we are still left with Reid’s problem 
of moral certainty.  So what if a Justice can, in fact, transcend the limits of her personal 
experience by the practice of empathy?  Why should we believe her decisions to be any more 
just than those of a Justice who doesn’t practice empathy?  What gives them their certainty, their 
moral imperative? 
Obama has never directly addressed such questions, but Wilson takes up a similar 
concern when he discusses the divine imprimatur of the moral sense.  Declaring that “the will of 
God” is “the supreme law,” Wilson says: 
  
If I am asked—why do you obey the will of God?  I answer—because it is my 
duty so to do.  If I am asked again—how do you know this to be your duty?  I 
answer again—because I am told so by my moral sense or conscience.  If I am 
asked a third time—how do you know that you ought to do that, of which your 
conscience enjoins the performance?  I can only say, I feel that such is my duty.  
Here investigation must stop; reasoning can go no farther.  The science of morals, 
as well as other sciences, is founded on truths, that cannot be discovered or 
proved by reasoning.133 
 
For Wilson, who later declares that “[o]ur instincts are no other than the oracles of eternal 
wisdom,” the reference to divine authority is the beginning and end of his argument in favor of 
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following the commands of the moral sense.134  Feeling, not reason, is proof enough.  Indeed, it 
is proof enough for all the “oracles” of Reid’s common sense.  
Obama never invokes the almighty as a guarantor of empathic wisdom, yet the logic of 
his argument veers in a similar direction.  He believes that practicing empathy will lead us to the 
same conclusions on difficult matters, but the certainty and moral imperative of these 
conclusions will be felt, not reasoned. “We are shaken out of our complacency,” Obama says of 
those who practice empathy.  “We are forced beyond our limited vision.  No one is exempt from 
the call to find common ground.”135   
As a jurisprudential matter, the intensity of such feelings provides a Justice the bedrock 
of certainty to which she can anchor her opinions in the five percent of “truly difficult” cases.  
Yet, the strength of that bedrock is ultimately determined not by her feelings, but by the degree 
to which they accord with everyone else who practices empathy.  Indeed, these are the high 
stakes for both Wilson and Obama of appealing to a sense of justice that purports to be universal 
and keenly felt, the first as a matter of instinct, the second as the result of a particular practice.  
When people feel the same way, the sense of justice is validated.  When they diverge, it is 
critically undermined. 
 No Justice has yet cited empathy as an essential part of her decision in a “truly difficult” 
case, but the experience of James Wilson in his one enduring Supreme Court opinion may serve 
as a warning.  That opinion came in Chisholm v. Georgia, what Akhil Amar has called “the first 
constitutionally significant case ever decided by the Supreme Court.”136  The case turned on the 
question of state sovereignty and whether, under Article III, the Court had jurisdiction over 
controversies between a State and a citizen of another state.  The plaintiff, Alexander Chisholm, 
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brought an original action in assumpsit against the state of Georgia for Revolutionary War debts 
owed to a South Carolina merchant, Robert Farquhar, over whose estate Chisholm served as 
executor.  Georgia refused to appear, claiming in a written objection that, as Georgia was a 
sovereign state, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the matter and could not force it to 
appear.  The Court, in a 5-1 decision, disagreed.  All six Justices wrote separate opinions, but 
Wilson’s was the most sweeping, examining the dispute from three vantage points, in their order, 
“the principles of general jurisprudence,” “the laws and practice of States and Kingdoms,” and 
“the Constitution.”137   
 Though he does not discuss the moral sense, Wilson uses Reid’s “excellent enquiry into 
the human mind, on the principles of common sense” to frame the first part of his argument.138  
Georgia’s defense of state sovereignty, says Wilson, is consequent to a “perverted use” of 
“metaphysics” by which a people is regarded as subordinate to, rather than constitutive of and 
superior to, a state.139  This misconception, says Wilson, is an inversion of “the natural order of 
things” by which a state is “useful and valuable as a contrivance” to man, from whose “native 
dignity [a state] derives all its acquired importance.”140  Consequently, says Wilson, the “basis of 
sound and genuine jurisprudence” is not that state sovereignty elevates a state over and above its 
people, but that the “sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.”141  
Accordingly, in light of the fact that a state is coextensive with man – or, more specifically, the 
men who make up its enfranchised citizenry – when a “State, like a merchant, makes a contract,” 
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such as the contract Georgia made with Farquhar, if either one “willfully refuses to discharge it,” 
they must be “amenable to a Court of Justice.”142 
 Having resolved what was, for him, the central jurisprudential issue at stake in the case, 
in the second part of the opinion, Wilson goes on a brief historical tour of “the law and practices 
of different States and Kingdoms” regarding state sovereignty before finally coming to the 
specific constitutional questions at the very end of the opinion.143  There, he addresses two 
questions:  “1. Could the Constitution of the United States vest jurisdiction over the State of 
Georgia? 2. Has that Constitution vested such jurisdiction in this Court?”144  He answers the first 
of them drawing on the “sound and genuine jurisprudence” of the first part of the decision.  If the 
origin of sovereignty is vested in man, and not in the state somehow apart from him, by ratifying 
the Constitution, “the people of Georgia, could vest jurisdiction or judicial power over [the other] 
States and over the State of Georgia in particular.”145  He then considers whether the people of 
Georgia have, in fact, done so.  He answers yes, “the people of the United States intended to bind 
the several States, by the Legislative power of the national Government” and, by extension, they 
“did vest this Court with jurisdiction over the State of Georgia.”146  
Wilson’s constitutional analysis dovetails with that of the four Justices in the majority, 
one of whom, John Blair, was also a member of Philadelphia Convention. The lone dissent by 
Justice Iredell notably avoids what he calls the “general [question], viz.  Whether, a State can in 
any instance be sued” in the Supreme Court, focusing instead on whether the Court could compel 
a state to appear specifically for an action in assumpsit.147  He concludes that the Court was not 
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vested with this particular power, though he does not challenge the conclusions of Wilson or the 
majority regarding state sovereignty and the general jurisdiction of the Court. 
Notwithstanding the broad majority and the points conceded to it by Justice Iredell, the 
Chisholm decision “burst on the country like a bombshell,” dividing staunch Federalists who 
supported the majority in its assertion of the Court’s power from the Anti-Federalists who were 
zealous to protect the rights of the states against the encroachment of the federal government.148  
The day after the decision, an amendment was introduced in Congress, making states immune to 
suits by individuals of another state.  Within two years, it would be ratified as the Eleventh 
Amendment, an event seen by some to be the only time “in its history [when] the federal 
judiciary [has] had its jurisdiction directly curtailed by constitutional amendment.”149 
 There is ongoing debate over the merit of Georgia’s specific claims against Chisholm, but 
in terms of the substantive decision of the majority, Caleb Nelson notes,  “[m]ost modern 
scholars . . . see nothing wrong with the Court’s decision to entertain Chisholm’s lawsuit in the 
first place and to order Georgia to respond.”150  James Wilson certainly believed he was on the 
right side of this argument.  He had been part of the five-member committee that drafted the 
relevant Article III language at the Philadelphia Convention.  More importantly, he believed that 
his jurisprudential claims, insofar as they were made with reference to the principles of common 
sense, were supposed to have universal purchase and the certainty of divine authority.  
Consequently, the fact that the Chisholm decision sparked an immediate popular backlash that 
ultimately saw it overturned by constitutional amendment must have confounded and chagrined 
James Wilson.  By his Chisholm opinion, he had raked the coals of a fierce and ongoing debate 
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over states rights.  Yet, as Stephen Conrad says, “it seems to have been his style and his way of 
“reasoning,” even more than his holding, that proved the most provocative.”151 Conrad cites a 
letter written by the framer William Davie to Justice Iredell as “so illustrative of the predominant 
reaction to Wilson’s opinion that it deserves to be quoted at length.”152  Because its sardonic tone 
highlights the dangers of a Justice locating the “essential ingredient” of her decision beyond law 
or precedent in some novel theory of jurisprudence, I think the letter is also worth quoting at 
length: 
  
I confess I read some of these arguments [in Chisholm] and particularly that by 
Mr. Wilson with astonishment:  however, the scope and propriety of this elaborate 
production called an argument, were expressly reserved for the contemplation of 
“a few, a very few comprehensive minds;” and, perhaps, notwithstanding the 
tawdry ornament and poetical imagery with which it is loaded and bedizened, it 
may still be very “profound.”  On this I shall give no opinion:  but as a law 
argument it has certainly the merit of being truly “original.”  His definition of the 
American States as sovereignties is more like an epic poem than a Judge’s 
argument, and we look in vain for legal principles or logical conclusions . . . 
[T]his whole argument of his seems to be the rhapsody of some visionary 
theorist.153 
 
Davie’s letter illustrates the danger of a Justice having recourse to a novel theory of 
jurisprudence in making her decisions, particularly in what ultimately proved to be a “truly 
difficult” case.  Wilson’s common sense arguments clearly overshadowed the substantive merits 
of the majority decision.  Their exotic quality, more “epic poem than a Judge’s argument,” made 
them appear to men like Davie as neither certain nor credible nor even clear.  If this was the fruit 
of common sense, a judge would be well advised to take his basket and go find some other tree. 
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Conclusion 
It remains to be seen whether new members of the Court will embrace President Obama’s 
jurisprudence of empathy or, for that matter, whether the President himself will stand by it in the 
face of criticism like Senator Charles Grassley’s that the “empathy standard appears to 
encourage judges to make use of their personal politics, feelings, and preferences” instead of 
helping judges to transcend them.154  That the word empathy went unmentioned in the 
nomination of Elena Kagan to replace retiring Justice John Paul Stevens suggests the President 
may be having second thoughts, if not about his jurisprudential views then at least about 
discussing them so openly.   
Still, even if the President has shied away from using the word empathy, his praise of 
Kagan for her “understanding of law, not as an intellectual exercise or words on a page, but as it 
affects the lives of ordinary people” suggests that the “essential ingredient” he looks for in a 
Supreme Court Justice has not changed.155  Moreover, for better or for worse, the President’s 
empathy standard has become a permanent part of the debate over his nominees, and it seems 
certain that the Justices he appoints will be judged by that standard for as long as they are on the 
bench.156 
Should he not disavow his jurisprudential theory outright, this article has argued that the 
experience of James Wilson and his jurisprudence of common sense may be instructive to 
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President Obama.  Both men believe there to be a small subset of cases where a Justice should 
look beyond written law and precedent in order to reach just decisions, and while each man 
champions a different jurisprudential tool for use in such cases, both aspire to the kind of 
certainty that makes Chief Justice Roberts’s “umpireal analogy” so attractive.   
No doubt, this is a laudable goal, but it is also impractical, for it burdens their 
jurisprudence with unreasonable expectations.  Whether in adherence to a jurisprudence of 
empathy or common sense, judicial decisions that look beyond law and precedent to moral 
arguments that claim universality and self-evidence aspire to a standard so high they inevitably 
fall short.  This does not mean that one must dispense with empathy or common sense in 
Supreme Court decision making.  Rather, one must be careful to treat them not as bellwethers of 
moral certainty, but as a resource for judicial decision making that, while not infallible, may 
nonetheless be the best tool available for deciding those cases where the law, for whatever 
reason, simply falls short. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
